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Abstract. Community network clouds provide for applications of local
interest deployed within community networks through collaborative ef-
forts to provision cloud infrastructures. They complement the traditional
large-scale public cloud providers similar to the model of decentralised
edge clouds by bringing both content and computation closer to the
users at the edges of the network. Services and applications within com-
munity network clouds require connectivity to the Internet and to the
resources external to the community network, and here the current best-
effort model of volunteers contributing gateway access in the community
networks falls short. We model the problem of reserving the bandwidth
at such gateways for guaranteeing quality-of-service for the cloud appli-
cations, and evaluate different pricing mechanisms for their suitability in
ensuring maximal social welfare and eliciting truthful requests from the
users. We find second-price auction based mechanisms, including Vick-
rey and generalised second price auctions, suitable for the bandwidth
allocation problem at the gateways in the community networks.
Keywords: community clouds; community networks; auctions; resource
allocation
1 Introduction
Community network clouds represent efforts to collaboratively build cloud infras-
tructures in the community networks [1,2], extending the ideas from the volunteer
computing model to community cloud computing [12]. Community networks are
a successful example of social collective for building ICT infrastructure for the
communities in a bottom-up fashion, for instance Guifi.net, currently the largest
community network in the world, connects more than 28,000 locations (nodes)
with wireless and optical fibre links [1]. Other examples of successful community
networks include Athens Wireless Metropolitan Network (AWMN) in Greece,
Freifunk in Germany, FunkFeuer in Austria, and Ninux in Italy.
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aim to provide services and applications of local interest for the communities
by applying the model cloud computing. They fit nicely with the recent shift in
exploring alternative approaches to large-scale data centres based public cloud
computing, which include Inter-Cloud and federated clouds (where multiple public
cloud providers work together), hybrid clouds (where enterprises combine their
own cloud infrastructure with the public clouds), multi-clouds (where applications
procure services from different public cloud providers), community clouds (where
dedicated infrastructure is provided for a specific community), and edge clouds
using nano data centres [14] (where smaller clusters are deployed at the edges
of the network to avoid latency and improve content-delivery). These initiatives
provide an excellent backdrop to explore the role of the community network
clouds in enhancing the value proposition of the community networks, since an
infrastructure of nano data centres [14] to be deployed in a community network
has to fit well with specific socio-economic and technical context of the community
networks [10]. Figure 1 shows how such an edge cloud can be deployed within a
community network. The servers are present at different locations, either caching
content for media-rich applications or performing computation locally for time-
critical applications, and which require connection to the data centres through the
Internet, for which they rely on the gateway providers available in the community
network [1].
When cloud applications are deployed within community networks, in many
cases connectivity external to the community network is important. In the basic
case, cloud applications may want to backup or synchronise data with servers
external to the community network, or require fetching data for operating the
service, for instance a video-on-demand service may download fresh content. Also,
a service available in multiple community networks requires access at the gateways
for exchanging data, and gateways in this case act to federate the community
networks. Applications from Internet of Things and smart cities involve collecting
data from the sensors, which may have to be shared with servers outside the
community network for data analysis. For the case of edge clouds, the servers
residing within the community networks, acting as nano data centres, require
connectivity to the data centres. In all these situations, the applications deployed
on servers within the community network require bandwidth at the gateways
with quality-of-service (QoS) guarantees to connect to the Internet, though their
requirements for prioritising, robustness, waiting time, and throughput, may vary
for different scenarios.
Various mechanisms have been extensively studied in the literature for pric-
ing bandwidth in wireless networks, including application of game theory and
auctions [11]. These concepts include static pricing approaches, like fixed usage-
based pricing where all users are charged the same amount per unit of bandwidth,
and priority pricing where users pay differently according to the priority class
of the requests, and dynamic market-based pricing mechanisms, which can be
based on auctions like sealed first-price, generalised second price (GSP) [7], and
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auctions [5]. In this paper, we study these pricing
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Fig. 1. Users connected to the service provider’s gateway in a community network
mechanisms with the goals of maximising social welfare (maximum utility for
maximum number of users), and truthfulness (users declare their true valua-
tion to the provider). Of the above mechanisms, only VCG ensures maximum
social welfare as well as truthfulness [13], as long as the optimal allocation of
resources can be computed in polynomial time. In practice, however, many re-
source allocation problems involve combinatorial optimisation and are NP-Hard,
so often approximation [19] or heuristics [5] based approaches are employed which
guarantee truthfulness but not maximal social welfare.
Recent work has explored auctions for incentivizing bandwidth sharing in
community networks [18, 21], and allocating bandwidth in public clouds [5, 15,
20] and grid systems [4]. However, the problem of bandwidth allocation for
applications in community network clouds has largely been unexplored to the best
of our knowledge. In community network clouds, there are multiple independent
bandwidth providers with no centralised control, and, moreover, the users are
connected to the providers through a multi-hop community network (in contrast
to the dedicated networks within large-scale data centres). Community networks
are a social collective [16], where most resources are contributed on a volunteer
and reciprocal basis. The gateways provide access to the Internet on a best-effort
basis, so providing guaranteed bandwidth to cloud applications is critical to the
successful operation of cloud applications deployed in community network clouds.
Our contribution in this paper is showing the applicability of decentralised
edge clouds model [14] to the community network clouds, and framing the problem
of bandwidth reservation at the gateways as crucial for cloud applications to
function and flourish in community network clouds. We provide a model that
differentiates between cloud applications with different priority classes, and use
4this model to evaluate the suitability of different pricing mechanisms in the
literature to the problem of bandwidth reservation in community network clouds.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We relate our work to the
state-of-the-art in section 2. We present our model in section 3 for analysing dif-
ferent pricing mechanisms for reserving bandwidth, and in section 4, we evaluate
them through simulation experiments. We conclude and indicate future work in
section 5.
2 Related Work
Community clouds built using resources contributed by the community have gar-
nered interest recently [12], with most work focusing on the exchange of virtualised
resources. Along with incentives-based resource regulation for providing and con-
suming virtual machines in community network clouds [8, 9], other approaches
have focused on social cloud computing [3] to share storage and computation
resources among the users of online social networks.
In respect of bandwidth resources, community networks require incentives
as communication relies on cooperation among the users. The recent literature
has modelled this in non-cooperative game theory [18,21]. Community networks
solve this problem to a large extent through social mechanisms like enforcing
reciprocal sharing agreements [1]. Bandwidth reservation has also been under
focus recently in the grid systems [4], and in public clouds, both for internal
bandwidth within data centre networks [6], and external bandwidth [5,15,20] to
the Internet.
Our work differs since we assume the co-operation among users because of the
social institution of community networks, so traffic from other nodes is guaranteed
to transit on the intermediary nodes. This also follows from the fact that the
bandwidth available within community networks is not priced, and is symmetric,
i.e. upstream capacity is same as downstream, and under normal use sharing does
not incur costs for the node owners [1]. Non-cooperative users are either excluded
from the system, or correct their behaviour because they are penalised by the
community. We focus on the cloud applications that are deployed in community
network cloud, which can be bandwidth-intensive generating significant traffic
flows within the community network, but also require guaranteed and stable
connection to the Internet through the gateways in the community network.
3 System Model
We consider a bandwidth provider P in the community network and a set of N
users {1, 2, . . . N}. The provider operates a gateway to the Internet, allowing
access external to the community network to the users. The users are connected
to the provider’s gateway through the wireless and fibre links in the community
network [1], and the applications in community network cloud access their external
servers and Internet through this gateway. Figure 1 shows the users in the
5community network connected to the provider through multiple such paths, where
only few of these users are the clients of the provider for reserving bandwidth.
The provider processes the requests in a queue at the gateway, where time
in the queue is divided into an infinite sequence of slots starting from 1, where
all the available bandwidth is allocated to exactly one user in each slot. The
provider allocates the slots in batch after receiving all the requests from N users
and assigns the next N slots, one to each user.
For the sake of simplicity, we divide the users into two priority classes,
h ∈ {0, 1}, some have lower priority requests, h0, and some have higher pri-
ority requests, h1. Here in this model, the main consideration for higher priority
requests is that they are more sensitive to the waiting time, and prefer to reserve
earlier slots in the queue. Provider P aims for an optimal schedule when allocat-
ing the slots to the users, so as to maximize its revenue and the overall utility
for all the users. We provide formal details below.
Schedule: A schedule φ maps each time slot t to a user i.
Value: For any schedule φ and user i, let t be the slot assigned to user i, then
vi(h, t) is the valuation given by i being allocated for time slot t, where h ∈ {0, 1}
is the priority class of the user. vi is communicated by each i to P beforehand.
Utility: For any schedule φ which assigns user i a slot t, the utility ui(φ, t)
for user i is difference between the value vi and the payment pi(φ, t) made by
user i to P.
ui(φ, t) = vi(h, t)− pi(h, t) (1)
Restriction: Any slot t can be assigned to at most one user.
Optimization: Find φ that maximizes the social welfare, which is the sum
of utilities ui of all users, while fulfilling the restrictions.
maximise welfare(φ) =
∑
i∈N
ui(φ, t) (2)
Scheduler: Function S that maps u = (ui)i∈N to optimal φ.
Goal: A user i when submitting the request to P, declares the priority class
hi and value vi, and also the bid amount bi where applicable. When the user
behaves truthfully the reported value v∗i is the same as her inherent value vi.
We want to ensure that it is truthful for every i to declare her true value of vi,
regardless of the declared values vj for any j 6= i. Such a mechanism is said to be
truthful in dominant strategy, where users have no incentive to misreport their
values [13].
3.1 Pricing Mechanisms
Given the above model, the prices are calculated for the bandwidth usage ac-
cording to different mechanisms [11].
Fixed Pricing In the case of fixed usage-based pricing, all the users pay
the identical price c0 for each unit of bandwidth consumed, which is constant
irrespective of the priority class.
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priority class h. Since in our model, there are only two priority classes h0 and
h1, provider P charges two different prices ch0 and ch1 per unit of bandwidth,
respectively.
First-Price Auction In the case of sealed first-price auction, users make
different bids bi depending on their priority class h, with high priority requests
quoting higher bid amounts in general. Each winning user pays their bid amount.
pi(φ, t) = bi (3)
Generalised Second Price (GSP) Auction In a generalised second price
(GSP) auction [7], users make different bids bi but in this case the winning user
pays the amount corresponding to the next highest bidder. So the user with the
highest bid, pays the amount of the second highest bidder, the second highest
bidder pays the amount of the third highest bidder and so on.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auction VCG is a second-price sealed-
bid auction based mechanism, which ensures truthfulness and maximum social
welfare [13], if the provider P can calculate optimal schedule φ in polynomial
time. Each user i provides a bid bi to P, and given a schedule φ, each user i pays
the price pi(φ, t) according to:
pi(φ, t) =
∑
j!=i
j∈N
(vj(h, φ′)− bj)−
∑
j!=i
j∈N
(vj(h, φ)− bj) (4)
where φ and φ′ are the schedules that maximise
∑
i∈N
ui while including and
excluding the bid bi by user i from the allocation respectively.
3.2 Scheduling Algorithm
We consider a simple scheduling algorithm which applies a greedy approach for
mapping users’ requests to the available slots. Algorithm 1 shows the scheduling
algorithm, where P assigns the slots to the users in non-increasing order of their
reported bids (and corresponding hi and vi) for the bandwidth resource. The
prices calculated are dependent on the pricing mechanism, the priority class
h of the requests, and the assigned slot t in the schedule φ. The runtime of
the algorithm is O(N log N) for N users, however, VCG mechanism requires
computing N schedules for calculating payments for the N winning bids, so the
running time in the case of VCG is O(N2 log N).
The greedy approach, in general, does not always provide an optimal alloca-
tion, which is a pre-requisite for VCG mechanism. However, in the case of the
model given above and considering the step function we are going to use for
vi(h, t) from Figure 2, the greedy approach from Algorithm 1 always returns an
optimal allocation. This can be proven through induction, and can be explained
intuitively as choosing the requests with higher bids first (corresponding to higher
hi and vi) always gives the maximum social welfare, since the value function
7Algorithm 1 Scheduling algorithm for φ, allocating −→t slots to N users
Input: List of users −→n , bids −→b , for total N users
Output: List of assigned slots −→t , and payments −→p
1: Sort −→n users in non-increasing order on their bids −→b
2: for i = 1, . . . N do
3: −→t [i]← i . Assign slots
4: end for
5: for i = 1, . . . N do
6: −→p [i]← payment(−→b [i],−→t [i]) . Calculate payments
7: end for
in Figure 2 is non-increasing with time and choosing a bid with lower amount
causes a loss in social welfare which can’t be recovered as the time progresses.
4 Performance Evaluation
We conduct the simulation experiments using the multi-agent programmable
modelling environment NetLogo [17]. In all the experiments, we consider a single
provider and 500 users. We run the experiments for 1000 rounds, and plot the
average values in the graphs.
For different pricing mechanisms (as explained in § 3.1), we use the following
values. For fixed pricing, we set c0 = 0.5. For priority pricing, we set ch0 = 0.25
and ch1 = 0.75. For auctions based pricing, the bids for lower priority requests h0
are uniformly distributed in the range [0.25, 0.5], while the bids for higher priority
requests h1 are uniformly distributed in the range (0.5, 0.75]. For differentiating
between the two priority classes, we choose different time-utility functions (TUF),
which in this case we have chosen as step functions for simplicity. According to
this step function, the value vi(h, t), based on priority class h and slot t in schedule
φ, decreases for both higher and lower priority classes after a threshold t0 = N2 ,
as shown in Figure 2. Specifically, for lower priority class h0:
vi(h0, t) =
{
1.5 if t ≤ N2
1 if N2 < t ≤ N
(5)
And for high priority class h1:
vi(h1, t) =
{
3 if t ≤ N2
2 if N2 < t ≤ N
(6)
Each user i submits exactly one request to P, declaring her priority class hi,
value vi, and bid amount bi where applicable. Both the priority classes, h0 and
h1 occur with the same probability, so almost half of the requests are of higher
priority, and the rest are of lower priority. We model lying behaviour of the users,
by randomly flipping their reported priority class h to P, according to a uniform
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Fig. 2. Value function vi(h, t) for user i based on priority class h and slot t in schedule
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Fig. 3. Percentage difference in social welfare as more users lie
distribution. When the users lie, we observe the normalized difference from the
case where all the users are truthful. Here, u∗i (φ, t) indicates the case where the
users lie to P, and ui(φ, t) where all the users are truthful.
∆ welfare =
∑
i∈N
u∗i (φ, t)−
∑
i∈N
ui(φ, t)∑
i∈N
ui(φ, t)
(7)
Figure 3 shows how social welfare is affected when the probability of a user
misreporting her value to P – p(lying) – increases up to the point where 90% of
the users may be lying. As expected, social welfare decreases as the probability
of lying increases, since P fails to allocate better slots for higher priority requests.
All the pricing schemes behave similarly as the proportion of lying users increases,
except VCG which performs marginally better in that social welfare is slightly
higher for VCG as compared to the other schemes. This shows the importance
of encouraging truthful behaviour in the users for maximising social welfare.
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Fig. 4. Percentage difference in utility for low priority class h0
To understand how the pricing mechanisms incentivize truthfulness for differ-
ent priority classes, in the next experiment we look at the normalised difference
in utility for an individual user (on average), separately for h0 and h1. Here again,
u∗i (φ, t) is the individual utility when some of the users lie, and ui(φ, t) is when
all the users are truthful.
∆ utility = u
∗
i (φ, t)− ui(φ, t)
ui(φ, t)
(8)
Figure 4 shows the percentage difference in the average utility for all the
users with low priority requests. Note that this average is over all the users in
h0, and not only those who lie. Users from h0 may lie in order to get higher
value (through reserving an earlier slot), hoping to still pay as less as possible.
Figure 4 shows that for fixed usage-based price, they do gain in utility since they
are paying the same amount for a better service. For priority pricing, they gain
nothing as any gains in utility are offset by the higher price. For first price and
GSP auctions, the results are similar and there are gains due to lying, though
less than those in the case of the fixed price. The first price and GSP auctions
behave similarly since expected payments are same in the first and second price
auctions, when the bids are independent and identically distributed [11], as is the
case in this experiment. VCG performs better since the utility decreases when
the users lie.
Figure 5 shows the percentage difference in the average utility for all the
users with high priority requests. Note that this average is over all the users in
h1, and not only those who lie. Users from h1 may lie in order to save on their
payments, with the hope that they can still get the same value (through keeping
their earlier slot). Figure 4 shows that users from h1, in general, lose by lying
since there is little chance that P will assign earlier slots to the users declaring
low priority to P. So even though they save on the payments, the decrease in
value because of getting assigned later slots results in net loss for users from h1.
In the next experiment, we look specifically at the utility for the users that
report untruthful values to P, to see the maximum gain they can get in the utility
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Fig. 5. Percentage difference in utility for high priority class h1
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Fig. 6. Maximum gain in utility for a user from low priority class h0
under different pricing mechanisms. Figure 6 shows the maximum gain in utility
a user from h0 can get as the number of lying users increases. Note that in this
case we pick only the maximum utility for a user from h0 that is lying, averaged
across all the experiment runs. The results are similar to what we observed earlier
in Figure 4.
Similarly, Figure 7 shows the maximum gain in utility a user from h1 can
obtain through lying. We noticed in Figure 5 that on average the users from h1
do not gain through lying, but here we see that for all the pricing mechanisms
except VCG, the utility for a lying user with high priority request increases with
increase in the number of lying users, though the net gain is not significant. For
VCG, the number of lying users does not have much impact, and the loss in
utility for the lying user remains almost the same. Moreover, first price and GSP
auctions perform better than priority pricing here. The user can have a net gain
in utility by misreporting her priority class as h0 when more than half of the
users are lying in the case of priority pricing.
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Fig. 7. Maximum gain in utility for a user from high priority class h1
4.1 Discussion
We find that static pricing schemes like fixed usage-based pricing and priority
pricing are not very useful for arbitration between requests from different priority
classes, since it is hard to avoid everyone reporting their requests as higher
priority [11]. Dynamic pricing, for example, based on first-price auction can help
here but with this simple auction scheme users report bid amounts lower than
their true valuation of the bandwidth resource [11]. VCG mechanism, when either
using with optimal allocation algorithms [13], or with approximate allocation
algorithm [19], ensures truthfulness but is often computationally intensive to
implement in practice. Generalised second price (GSP) auction mechanism, an
extension of VCG, is not as computationally intensive as VCG and even though it
doesn’t guarantee truthfulness, it shares many desirable properties of VCG [11].
We think that in the context of bandwidth reservation for applications in
community network clouds, GSP mechanism is a good candidate for using in
allocation algorithms that need to run often, i.e. once every second. On the
other hand, VCG can be used effectively where users reserve bandwidths over
longer periods, for instance a cloud service may want to schedule bandwidth
for performing backups every night over the whole month. In such situations,
the provider can easily forgo computational efficiency of other approaches for
the economic efficiency of the VCG mechanism, as it guarantees maximal social
welfare.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Cloud computing with its success in providing virtualised resources on demand
has transformed the technology landscape, revolutionising how Internet applica-
tions are developed and delivered to the users. Perhaps now is the right oppor-
tunity to take full advantage of the virtualisation and distributed edge model of
the cloud computing to design the killer applications for the community network
clouds. The success of such cloud applications requires better and guaranteed
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access to the Internet from within the community network to meet their through-
put and latency constraints, for which the current best-effort provisioning model
doesn’t match up.
In this paper, we applied various pricing mechanisms from the literature to
bandwidth allocation problem of cloud applications in community networks, and
studied their impact on the social welfare and truthfulness. We found that second-
price based GSP and VCG mechanisms are good candidates for arbitration in
bandwidth reservation algorithms. However, these mechanism assume that the
provider is trustworthy, which in the case of multiple independent providers in
the community network with no centralised control is difficult to ensure, and this
is the focus for our future work. Another challenge is that multiple users may be
connected to the provider using the same path in the community network, and
reserving bandwidth for such users in the same time interval may cause congestion
across some of the links, which an intelligent allocation algorithm should try to
avoid. Lastly, any bandwidth reservation scheme should not negatively impact the
normal operation of the community network for its users, so allocation mechanism
needs to be adaptive to the network congestion and bandwidth usage in the
community network.
Community network clouds build upon the vast research in peer-to-peer,
volunteer and edge computing, and we see a huge opportunity in extending this
work for building the core community cloud services that drive innovation in
many related areas, and not just the edge cloud computing. We believe that
the determinant of this success will not be just the technical sophistication with
which the research challenges and open problems are solved, but also by how
well the enthusiasts of the community network clouds succeed in capturing the
imagination and meeting the expectations of the members of the community
networks.
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